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Reconsidering the Original Founding of Indian and Non-Indian
America: Why a Second American Founding Based on Principles of
Deep Diversity is Needed
Raymond Cross*
"As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger
communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to
extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same
nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached,
there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to
men of all nations and races."
Charles Darwin'
"The whole world is coming,
A nation is coming, a nation is coming,
The eagle has brought the message to the tribe.
The father says so, the father says so.
Over the whole earth they are coming.
The buffalo are coming, the buffalo are coming,
The Crow has brought the message to the tribe,
The father says so, the father says so."
Sioux Ghost Dance Chant
2
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Twin Founding of Indian and Non-Indian America
Two Americas-one Indian and one non-Indian-were simultaneously
created in what constitutional scholar Martin Becker calls that "privileged
moment" which witnessed, in the late eighteenth century, the founding of
the world's first constitutional republic-the United States of America.
That privileged moment also postulated the future co-existence of two radi-
cally differing future visions-one non-Indian and one Indian-of Ameri-
can civil society. The non-Indian version of American civil society was
consciously constructed as "a merely rationalistic instrumental entity.",4 As
renowned constitutional scholar David Epstein puts it, the American consti-
tutional republic was founded as the practical answer to the long-standing
* Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law.
1. Robin Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny iii (Pantheon Books 2000).
2. Frederick Turner, Beyond Geography: The Western Spirit Against Wilderness 290 (Viking
Press 1980).
3. Stephen A. Conrad, The Rhetorical Constitution of "Civil Society" at the Founding: One
Lawyer's Anxious Vision, 72 Ind. L. J. 335, 335-36 (1997).
4. Id. at 339.
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Lockean riddle that asked why inherently free and sovereign individuals
would act in concert to "secure.. .this end that individuals out of fear and
prudence, [would] join together to form a civil society in the first place."
Constitutional scholar Steven Conrad likewise views the American republic
"as an agen[t] of libertarian revolution," given that it was consciously born
of non-Indians' "self interest, prudence or fear. , 5 It was, in Conrad's as-
sessment, a deliberately adopted political recourse to those known and
failed historical examples of civil society that the non-Indian settlers of
America had purposely left behind in the Old World.6
A competing Indian version of American civil society was simultane-
ously established by the founding of the American constitutional republic in
the late eighteenth century. While Indians are briefly mentioned in the
American constitution,7 it was left to Chief Justice John Marshall to de-
velop federal common law principles that, based on his socio-legal analysis
regarding the nature and character of Indian civil society at the time of the
founding of the American republic, would lay the foundation for future
legal and political intercourse between the non-Indian and Indian peoples of
America.8 Marshall's assessment of the Indian people's inherent character
as "fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was
drawn chiefly from the forest," 9 demanded the establishment of a politically
and geographically separate "Indian America." What was the practical po-
litical and legal result, at least from the non-Indians' viewpoint, that fol-
lowed from Marshall's judicially perceived "actual state of things?"'10
B. Why Chief Justice John Marshall Excluded Indian Peoples from the
Future Civic Life of the American Republic
Marshall's Indian law opinions justified the Founders' "politically re-
imagined"'1 American civil society, consciously excluding Indians from
any role within the future civic life of the new American republic. He gave
this answer to his own rhetorical question: "[w]hat was the inevitable con-
sequence of this actual state of things?" in the following manner "[t]he
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. "Indians not taxed" are excluded, by Article I sec. 2 of the Constitution, from being counted for
legislative apportionment purposes. Congress is specifically empowered, by Article I sec. 8 of the Con-
stitution, to "regulate Commerce... with the Indian tribes." U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 8.
8. Chief Justice John Marshall's process of incorporating the Indian peoples and their lands with
the America domestic sphere of control was accomplished over the course his opinions in what is popu-
larly called Marshall's Indian Law Trilogy: Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (incorporating
aboriginal Indian land titles into federal ownership); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)
(denominating Indian tribes as "domestic, dependent nations"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515
(1832) (establishing an exclusive, bilateral relationship between the federal government and the Indian
peoples).
9. 21 U.S. at 590.
10. Id.
11. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of National-
ism (rev. ed. 1991).
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Europeans were under the necessity of either abandoning the country, and
relinquishing their pompous claims to it, or enforcing those claims by the
sword, and by the adoption of principles adapted to the condition of a peo-
ples with whom it was impossible to mix, and who could not be governed as
a distinct society, or of remaining in their neighborhood, and exposing
themselves and their families to the perpetual hazard of being massacred."'
' 2
The non-Indian Founders' rationally-based "prudence and fear" therefore
justified, as Marshall's Trilogy 3 expressly declared, the intentional exclu-
sion of Indian peoples from any role in the civic life of the newly founded
American constitutional republic. My essay argues for a new dialogue be-
tween the Indian and non-Indian peoples that will lead to the re-negotiation
of their contemporary legal and political relationship, free of the overween-
ing climate of non-Indian "fear and prudence" that doomed the hope for any
such reasonable dialogue between these two peoples in the late eighteenth
century. 14
C. Can "Real" and "Artificial" Political Communities Speak To One
Another?
Some contemporary moral and legal scholars would question whether
such a dialogue between the Indian and non-Indian peoples is any more
possible today than it was some two hundred years ago. Professor Paul S.
Berman characterizes America's Indian peoples as living in real communi-
ties while America's non-Indian peoples reside in artificial communities. 5
Real communities, in Berman's terms, are based on their members' tangible
and palpable relationships that arise directly from their interlaced and inter-
twined blood and kinship ties. Artificial communities, in Berman's assess-
ment, are based on their members' voluntary agreement to organize a soci-
ety based on rational concepts so as to realize rational goals.' 6 The famed
American pragmatist philosopher, Richard Rorty, seemingly agrees with
Berman when he concludes that legitimate legal and social communication
between real and artificial societies is practicably impossible.17 According
to Rorty, the members of a given discourse community are imprisoned by
their community's ruling assumptions and dominant informational systems.
The individual members' behavior and conduct are governed by what Rorty
calls "a logic of action," accessible to, and understood by, only those who
are bona fide members of that community.1
8
12. 21 U.S. at 590 (emphasis added).
13. See supra n.7 and accompanying text.
14. Conrad, supra n.3, at 339-40.
15. Paul S. Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311 (2003).
16. Id. at461.
17. Donald G. Ellis, Crafting Society: Ethnicity, Class and Communication Theory 141 (1999).
18. Id.
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D. How the Indian Peoples May Re-Negotiate Their Compact with the Non-
Indian Peoples of America
But my re-negotiated civil compact between the Indian and non-Indian
peoples does not demand that either party fully appreciate or understand,
much less embrace and practice, the more exotic or troubling customs or
traditions of their respective societies. My far less demanding, re-imagined,
new civil compact between the Indian and non-Indian peoples requires
only-in its first iteration, at least-that they accord mutual and reciprocal
legal and political respect to the underlying values and practices that define
the character of their respective societies.
Instilling and enforcing such mutual and reciprocal respect, as among the
diverse ethnic and cultural groups inhabiting multi-ethnic America, is
viewed by contemporary political philosophers John Rawls and Michael
Walzer as the sine qua non for the political maintenance and moral devel-
opment of that civil society. 19 Whether my re-imagined civil compact be-
tween the Indian and non-Indian peoples will mature into its final, and far
more demanding, political and legal state, will depend on the success en-
joyed by my hypothesized agential revolution in the re-founded American
20
civil society.
E. Why the Second Founding Of American Civil Society Must Be Based On
Principles of Deep Diversity
While my short term goal is to merely improve, through a newly estab-
lished reciprocal and mutually respectful dialogue, the present legal and
social relations between the Indian and non-Indian peoples, my long term
goal is more ambitious in its scope and reach. By re-negotiating, per my
proposed agential terms, the existing civil compact between the Indian and
non-Indian peoples, I hope to foster the authentic development of what so-
cial anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, calls "deep diversity. 21 Professor
Geertz calls for a new political and legal dialogue as among the world's
19. Michael Walzer, Thick And Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad (1994); John Rawls,
A Theory of Justice (1971).
20. Victoria McGeer, Hope, Power and Governance: Why Institutionalize Hope? 592 Annals 100,
105 (March, 2004). Professor McGeer takes a poetic approach to her description of human agential
development: "[Hiuman agency is about imaginatively exploring our own powers, as much as it is about
using them. Hence, it is about imaginatively exploring what can and cannot do in the world. To be
effective agents, we must of course learn to negotiate this world within certain constraints. But equally,
it seems we must learn to experience our own limitations.. .[H]ope is the energy and direction we are
able to give, not just toward making the world as we want it to be but also toward the regulation and
development of our own agency. In hoping, we create a kind of imaginative scaffolding that calls for the
creative exercise of our capacities and so, often, for their development... It is crucial to take a reflective
and developmental stance toward our own capacities as agents-hence, it is to experience ourselves as
agents of potential as well as agents in fact."
21. Clifford Geertz, Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics 218-63
(2000).
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differing and plural, ethnic and cultural minorities and majorities.2 2 He
believes such a new and broad gauged dialogue will engender new political
and legal understandings as among today's rival ethnic and religious
groups. Only such a dialogue, in Geertz's estimation, will produce those
new legal and political institutions essential for the peaceful mediation of
those ethnic and cultural tensions inherent in our increasingly diverse, but,
nonetheless, inexorably interconnected world.23
Rather than accept the future globalized "clashes of cultures," that some
political pessimists forecast as both inevitable and necessary so as to estab-
lish the dominance of the Western world's way of life, he calls for alterna-
tive dialogic action that will hopefully result in new specific, localized legal
and political institutions and practices. Only these new practices and institu-
tions will enable differing political and social cultures to navigate in what
has become a "splintered and disassembled" modem world.24
But Geertz requires the interlocutors who participate in this new dialogue
to meet a high standard. Their dialogue must embody "[n]ew ways [of
thinking] that are responsive to particularities, to individualities, oddities,
contrasts, and singularities, responsive to what Charles Taylor has called
'deep diversity,' a plurality of ways of belonging and being, and that yet
can draw from them-from it-a sense of connectedness that is neither
uniform nor comprehensive, primal nor changeless, but nonetheless real. 25
My short-term goal in my essay is to set the terms of new "specific and
localized" dialogues as between the Indian and non-Indian peoples of
America. My long-term goal is to encourage the growth and development
of an authentic "deep diversity" that will, in its mature state, hopefully em-
brace all of America's present and emerging ethnic and cultural minorities
within the terms and tenor of my proposed new civil compact.26
F. Can The Indian Peoples Foster The Agential Revolution?
How do I propose to achieve my envisioned short and long term goals?
By up-dating and re-negotiating, in agentialist terms, the original Indian
civil compact that was declared by Chief Justice Marshall in his famed
Trilogy of Indian Law Opinions. Three key agential factors will play a ma-
jor role in the development of this new compact between the Indian and
non-Indian peoples: educational agency, political agency and legal agency.
If these three agential factors are accorded due regard and weight in the re-
negotiation of the Indian people's compact with America, then, I believe,
22. Id. at 224.
23. Id. at 222.
24. Id. at 227-3 1.
25. Id. at 224.
26. Id. at 246.
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new and re-imagined American civic institutions, ones that are based on the
principles of authentic deep diversity, can emerge
27
In Part two of my essay I describe the terms and conditions of the origi-
nal Indian compact that historically defined the legal and political relations
between the Indian and non-Indian peoples of America. In Part three of my
essay I articulate the new agential terms of relationship that will form the
basis of my re-negotiated civil compact between the Indian and non-Indian
peoples of America. In Part four of my essay of I extend the agential prin-
ciples embodied in this new civil compact so as to embrace the human
needs and group aspirations of America's other existing and emerging eth-
nic groups and other cultural minorities. In my conclusion, I reflect on the
past two hundred years of political and legal relations between the Indian
and non-Indian peoples of America and I look forward to the next two hun-
dred years of civic relationship, hopefully based on the agential principles
that I have articulated in my essay.
II. WHY "BELONGING" TO AMERICA MATTERS TO THE INDIAN AND NON-
INDIAN PEOPLES
A. Why the Political Mythology of "Belonging" Is So Important To Both
the Indian and Non-Indian Peoples of America
That "privileged moment" which witnessed the founding of the Ameri-
can constitutional republic in the late eighteenth century also established
two fundamentally distinct civil compacts that define how the Indian peo-
ples, on the one hand, and non-Indian people, on the other hand, belong to
America. This twin founding of Indian and non-Indian America is most
appropriately told-not in the dreary tomes written by constitutional law
scholars or the drab scientific texts written by Indian anthropologists or
ethnographers-but by the respective "creation myths" these people offer to
justify the great individual and collective sacrifices demanded by the found-
ing of the shared America we know and love today.
Such grievous sacrifices as were necessitated by this twin founding of
America can only be fully portrayed, as well as accepted by the human
heart, when they are elevated to the mythic level of a common and shared
American destiny. I strive to tell these two people's "myth of American
belonging" so that we can perhaps finally understand, and thus accept, the
27. McGeer, supra n.20, at 123. Professor McGeer again offers an evocative image of such a
political community: "How is such a community to be achieved? Practically speaking, the most effec-
tive course may be to cultivate in oneself an interpersonal capacity for attending to the cares and con-
cerns of others, thus seeing them as struggling hopeful agents in their own right who require support
from others if their own hopeful energy is not to flag and die ...Hoping well thus involves cultivating a
meta-disposition in which some of one's hopeful energy becomes directed towards supporting the hope-
ful agency of others..."
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sacrifice of blood and life that accompanied the twin founding of Amer-
ica.21
B. How the Restoration of the "Thunderbirds" To the Hidatsa Indians'
Rightful Custody Brought Back the Rain to Drought Stricken North Dakota
Some 70 years ago the tribal elders of the Hidatsa water buster clan agi-
tated for the Heye Museum in New York City to return their sacred thun-
derbirds to their custody on the Fort Berthold Reservation in western North
Dakota. The thunderbirds are the skulls of the water busters clan's tribal
ancestors. Along with their associated funerary items and medicine bundles
the thunderbirds balanced the seasons and connected the Hidatsa people to
their surrounding physical and cultural landscapes within their traditional
homelands along the bottom lands of the Missouri River.
Coincident with the tribal elders' latest campaign for the thunderbirds'
return, the worst drought and dust bowl on record had enveloped the farms
and ranches of 1930s western North Dakota. It was the theft of the thunder-
birds that brought this situation to pass, the Hidatsa elders told an incredu-
lous non-Indian public. Only their safe return would end this state of affairs
and bring the rains back to the parched farm and ranch lands of western
North Dakota. The Heye Museum in New York City, stung by the mount-
ing congressional and public criticism, finally relented and agreed to return
the thunderbirds to the water buster clan on the Fort Berthold Reservation.
The "rest of the story," as radio commentator Paul Harvey would put it,
was told in a full page Sunday comics spread in the Bismarck Tribune.
"Ripley's Believe It Or Not" told its readers that the same day the thunder-
birds arrived on the Great Northern Railroad, the rains returned to western
North Dakota.
The lesson learned from my story is not that the traditional Indian world
is suffused by ritual and magical belief, though it well maybe. Nor is the
lesson taught that non-Indians, too, yearn for an encompassing meaning that
renders nature's arbitrary treatment of them understandable, though they
probably do. No, my story shows that the Hidatsa peoples, like other Indian
peoples, belong to America in a manner fundamentally different from those
European and other immigrants who came later to settle, what was to them,
a new land.
C. How the Indian People's Original Compact with America Served Their
Historic Needs and Aspirations
The pragmatic legal and political difference in how the Indian peoples
belong to America is the practical result of Chief Justice John Marshall's
28. I rely on my personal knowledge of Mandan-Hidatsa creation myths and my youthful cine-
matic experience watching a wide variety of vintage American westerns as the composite source for
telling my American creation stories.
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three famous Indian law opinions dating from 1823 to 1832. His trilogy of
foundational Indian law opinions29 introduced the "aboriginality doctrine"
into the American common law. In this doctrine, Marshall established the
Indian people's distinctive mode of belonging to America in three legal
principles. First, he recognized the Indian people's inherent ownership of
their aboriginally occupied lands.30 Second, he confirmed the Indian peo-
ple's retained right of self-governance over their lands as "domestic, de-
pendent nations.",3' Third, he pledged the federal government's honor to
protect the Indian people's inherent and retained rights from outside inter-
ference. 32 Marshall's three Indian law opinions-implemented by later fed-
eral treaties, statutes and executive orders-set the terms for the original
political and legal compact between the Indian and non-Indian peoples.33
While this original compact may have served the historic needs and aspi-
rations of the Indian peoples, I contend that it must be re-negotiated today,
in agential terms, so as to foster the growth of a second American civil so-
ciety, one founded on authentic principles of deep diversity. The new com-
pact will serve as the starting point for new dialogues that focuses on three
agential factors of development that I believe can lead, ultimately, to a new
American civic order. These three agential factors are: educational agency,
political agency and legal agency. If they are given their due regard and
weight within the new legal and political dialogue between these two peo-
ples, then a re-founded American civic order will hopefully emerge, one
founded on Geertz's "deep diversity" principles.
D. The Nature and Scope of the Indian People's Compact with America
Due to their unique compact with America, sociologists and political
theorists attribute a "thick" social and political identity to the Indian peo-
ples. Indian identity can therefore only be adequately comprehended by the
deep description of a given Indian person's specific tribal life ways that link
him to America via his belonging to a particular tribe, clan, and aboriginal
territory.34 America's non-Indian peoples, by contrast, possess a "thin" po-
29. See supra, n.8.
30. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
31. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
32. See Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
33. Marshall created this dialogic basis by "contradistinguish[ing] [the Indian peoples] by a [politi-
cal] name appropriate to themselves" and that name is "tribe." 30 U.S. at 18. Professor Stephen Cornell
suggests that by "tribalizing" the Indian peoples, Marshall may have been promoting their political
maturation: "[T]ribalization could have advantages for Indians. They, too, had political agendas; they
also were in pursuit of peace, secure borders, access to resources only available from their adversaries.
Centralized political structures, often including new leadership positions, had advantages in dealing with
European and American governments and their representatives. As such, dealing came to play a larger
role in Indian life; specialized political organization became increasingly advantageous. It offered op-
portunities to ambitious individuals or factions seeking to extend their influence or power." Stephen
Cornell, The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence 79 (1988).
34. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad (1994).
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litical and legal identity arising out of their very different legal and histori-
cal relationship to America.
E. The Nature and Scope of the Non-Indian People's Compact with
America
Two very different views of how the non-Indian peoples came to belong
to America may help illustrate the vast differences between them and the
Indian peoples of America. First, a scholarly view of how non-Indians came
to belong to America. Sociologist Brackette F. Williams contrasts Amer-
ica's Indian peoples with what she calls America's "voluntary minorities."
36
She is referring to all those many Northern and Southern European ethnic
groups who immigrated to America from the mid-nineteenth to early twen-
tieth centuries. These ethnic groups voluntarily shed their "Old World"
identities and adapted to the prevailing American norms and values as the
price of their admission to the New World. Through a generations long
adaptive process that Williams calls "ethnic succession," these former
European ethnics moved from America's service class, to the crafts and
trades and ultimately, to the "top rung" American professions as lawyers,
doctors, academics and political leaders.37
In becoming what Professor Williams calls "honorary white Americans,"
these erstwhile European ethnics relinquished their "thick" Old World iden-
tities that had tied them to their local village-based customs and dialects,
their traditional colorful costumes of dress, as well their local myths, super-
stitions and oral histories. In exchange, they received the "thin" identity of
American citizenship that, of practical necessity, suppressed these ethnic
groups' idiosyncratic and multifarious Old World identities in service of a
common, but severely limited, set of American civic freedoms and rights.38
Second, a contemporary film maker's view of how non-Indians came to
belong to America. Martin Scorcese's visually sumptuous, but extraordinar-
ily violent, film, The Gangs of New York, essays the same ethnic terrain as
did Williams. 39 He tells the story of the warring, rival immigrant groups
who contested for control of the back alleys and water fronts of mid-
nineteenth century New York City. These rival ethnic groups, or "tribes" as
the film's narrator calls them, bear distinctive names such as the Dead Rab-
35. Id.
36. Brackette F. Williams, A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation Across Ethnic Ter-
rain, 18 Ann. Rev. Anthropology 401-44 (1989).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Gangs of New York (Miramax Studios 2002) (motion picture). Movie critic, Jeff Shannon,
writes director Scorcese's film tells a "tale of primal vengeance between Irish American son Amsterdam
Vallon (Leonardo Di Caprio) and his father's ruthless killer and 'Nativist' gang leader Bill 'the Butcher'
Cutting (Daniel Day-Lewis, brutally inspired), so named for his lethal talent with knives." Scorcese's
film "erases the decorum of text books" to tell "American history written in blood, unflinching, authen-
tic, and utterly spectacular." Editorial Reviews, Amazon.com.
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bits, the Plug Uglies and the Native Americans, each name evocative of
some ethnic characteristic that set one ethnic gang apart from another. The
film's hero, played by Leonardo Di Caprio, witnesses, as a young child, his
father's vicious murder at the hands of a rival gang lord, played by Daniel
Day-Lewis. Di Caprio's father, a priest of sorts, was the leader of the Dead
Rabbits, an Irish tribe that recently immigrated to America from County
Kerry, Ireland.40
Di Caprio's character swears an "old world blood oath" of revenge
against his father's murderer. He plots throughout the movie to fulfill his
oath at the opportune time. Bloody confrontation after confrontation
chronicles these rival immigrant tribes struggles for primacy within
Scorcese's version of "ethnic succession" in New York City. These groups
battled first for control of New York's streets and later for political control
of New York's electoral machinery. Scorcese's film ends with these rival
ethnic gangs swallowed up in an even larger conflagration-the American
Civil War. Because these ethnic groups' alternative and idiosyncratic values
and loyalties ultimately conflicted with the new American nation's ability
to coercively draft sufficient immigrant manpower to prosecute its war
against the break-away Confederate states, Scorcese graphically depicts
their gruesome destruction by American military might.41
In the film's climactic scene the American naval bombardment of the
gangs' Five Points stronghold liquidates most of their members. Daniel
Day-Lewis' character, now dead and buried in Potter's Field on the Brook-
lyn side of the East River, bears silent witness to the rise of world's greatest
city, modern New York City. We, too, as film-goers, see in the blink of an
eye, through the magic of time-lapse photography, the rise of Manhattan's
distinctive skyline of towering, perpendicular, literally gleaming shafts of
steel and glass.42
Scorcese's film and Williams' essay tell the same story: the necessary
breaking of Old World ethnic loyalties and idiosyncratic value systems so
as to release their immigrant captives into a common American civic iden-
tity. Simplification of the American political order, by constitutional inter-
pretation where possible and by coercion when necessary, came at the ex-
pense, as Scorcese and Williams maintain, of rival ethnic groups' identities
and values. Well known examples of this "Americanization" process range
from the state's outlawing of the Mormon practice of polygamy, the state's
confrontation with the Amish over that religious sect's refusal to send their
children to high school, to America's ghastly decision to imprison Japa-
nese-Americans during WWII out of its ostensible fear of that ethnic
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. An anonymous reviewer ("Marc My Words") writes that Scorcese's film tells the story of
"America as the great melting pot or a country fought and died for by those feeling worthy of the term
natives." Id.
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group's divided loyalties and their possible propensity for sabotage of
American war interests.43
F. How the Contemporary Supreme Court Has Seemingly "Misread" The
Indian Peoples' Original Compact with America
Given the American state's drive over the past two hundred years to craft
a common American civic identity, seemingly at the expense of its ethnic
and cultural minorities, it may come as a surprise that the contemporary
Supreme Court's Indian law opinions have seemingly re-affirmed the In-
dian peoples' original compact with America. Indian law scholars have
appropriately applauded these opinions as "keeping faith" with Marshall's
"aboriginality doctrine."'44 Unfortunately, this seeming judicial affirmation
of Marshall's tribal sovereignty and autonomy principles comes with what,
I believe, is an unacceptably high price tag: the deepened exclusion of the
Indian peoples from any meaningful legal or political role within contempo-
rary American civic life.
The Supreme Court's recent Indian jurisdictional decisions have expli-
cated this deepened exclusion of the Indian peoples from American civic
life in terms of the Indian peoples' presumptive lack of inherent criminal
jurisdiction,45 inherent regulatory jurisdiction, 6 and adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion47 over non-Indians who commit crimes or civil wrongs within Indian
Country. Libertarian legal scholars, such as Paul S. Berman, seemingly
approve of these Indian jurisdictional decisions that reduce Indian tribes to
"non-territorial entities" that may legitimately exercise jurisdiction only
over those individuals who expressly subject themselves to Indian jurisdic-
48tion.
The Supreme Court has candidly acknowledged that its opinions will
likely make it more difficult for the Indian peoples to maintain basic civil or
criminal order within Indian Country. However, the Court has left open the
possibility of future congressional remedial action49 or of tribal civil regula-
tory jurisdiction over a particular non-Indian defendant, if his actions pose a
demonstrable "direct and substantial" threat to a protected tribal interest.5°
Although the Court did not repudiate the Indian peoples' original compact
43. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
44. Charles Wilkinson, American Indians, Time and the Law (1988).
45. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
46. Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
47. Strate v. A-i Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
48. See Berman, supra n.15, at 461.
49. While Rehnquist recognizes that the "prevalence of non-Indian crime on today's reservations"
may "forcefully argue... [in favor of Indian people's] ability to try non-Indians..." he concludes that
"these are considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian tribes should finally be
authorized to try non-Indians." See 435 U.S. 191,212 (1978).
50. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Reservation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989).
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with America, it substantially re-wrote it.51 Justice Rehnquist's Oliphant 52
opinion extended Chief Justice Marshall's extremely circumspect and ex-
ternally-focused "implicit divestiture" doctrine deep into the geographic
confines of Indian Country.5 3 As a result, today's Indian peoples have been
judicially deprived of their inherent sovereign jurisdiction over non-
members, even within the geographic confines of their own federally rec-
ognized tribal homelands, popularly known as Indian Country.54
G. Why Did The "Sick Chicken" Cross the Jurisdictional Road into Indian
Country? Because Tribal Governments Are Not Constitutionally Obligated
to Accord Due Process to Non-Member Defendants
The Supreme Court arguably foreswore, in the aftermath of its notorious
1935 Schecter55 decision-more popularly known as the "sick chicken"
decision-any overt usurpation of Congress' legislative functions under the
interpretive guise of its ill-fated "substantive due process" doctrine. 6
While it may have foresworn its role as "judicial legislator" in other areas
of the law, its role, in that regard, seems to be alive and well in the Indian
law arena. Some Indian law scholars attribute the Court's revived "legisla-
tive" role in federal Indian law to its 1978 decision in Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez.7
There, an Indian tribe, Santa Clara Pueblo, imposed a membership rule
that admittedly discriminated against the off-spring of female members of
the tribe, while it materially advantaged the off-spring of male members of
that tribe. The Santa Clara Pueblo, a federally recognized Indian tribe, de-
nied tribal membership to the children of a female tribal member who had
married outside the tribe. But that same tribal government enrolled the chil-
dren of any male tribal member who had similarly married outside the
tribe.5 8
5 1. Professor Joe Singer criticized the Brendale decision re-characterizing the Indian peoples as a
legally disfavored racial caste: "The Supreme Court has assumed in recent years that although non-
Indians have the right to be free from the political control by Indian nations, American Indians can and
should be subject to the political sovereignty of non-Indians. This disparate treatment of both property
and political rights is not the result of neutral rules being applied in a manner that has disparate impact.
Rather, it is the result of formally unequal rules. Moreover, it can be explained only by reference to
perhaps unconscious racist assumptions about the distribution of both nature and power. This fact im-
plies an uncomfortable truth: both property rights and political power are associated with a system of
racial caste." Joseph Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1991).
52. See435 U.S. 191 (1978).
53. See Richard B. Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 Wash. L.
Rev. 479 (1979).
54. Id.
55. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
56. See Dawn E. Johnson, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court: Presidential Influences on
Congressional Change, 78 Ind. L. J. 363, 368-371 (2003).
57. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
58. Id. at 60.
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The lower federal courts had no difficulty in holding this tribal member-
ship rule invalid as invidiously discriminatory governmental action that
singled out and unfairly burdened female tribal members. Because the tribal
government failed to demonstrate a "compelling governmental interest"
justifying such discrimination, the lower courts held the tribal enrollment
ordinance violated the equal protection and due process guarantees of gov-
erning federal law.59
But the Supreme Court resoundingly reversed the lower federal courts'
holdings in this regard-why? Although its opinion was couched in proce-
dural and jurisdictional terms, the underlying logic of the Court's opinion
harkened back to its earlier, unapologetically substantive judicial decisions
such as Talton v. Mayes 60 and Ex Parte Crow Dog.
61
Extending America's equal protection and due process norms into Indian
Country threatened, in the Supreme Court's estimation, the nation's long-
standing compact with the Indian peoples. That compact, among other
things, guaranteed the right of Indian self-governance over peculiarly In-
dian matters, such as the issue of who is eligible for tribal membership.62
Because the lower federal courts had failed to evince "proper judicial re-
spect" for tribal sovereignty, the Supreme Court reversed their holdings
regarding the enrollment status of Mrs. Martinez's children.63
In language evocative of language from its much earlier opinion in an
Indian criminal jurisdiction case, Ex Parte Crow Dog, 64 the Court upheld
the Santa Clara Pueblo's exclusive authority to determine issues of tribal
membership. In Crow Dog, the Court struck down the federal government's
effort to extend federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians who wrongfully
killed their fellow tribal members. In rejecting federal criminal jurisdiction
over Indian criminal conduct the Court said:
"[Such federal action] seeks to impose on the [Indians] the restraint of an
external and unknown code.. .which judges them by standards made by oth-
ers and not for them.. .It tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of
their peoples, nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a different race
according to the law of a social state of which they have an imperfect con-
ception, and which is opposed to the traditions of their history, to the habits
of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one which
measures the red man's revenge by the maxims of white man's morality. 65
Indian law scholars resoundingly praised the Martinez decision as "keep-
ing faith" with the historic Indian compact with America. Only a few Indian
law scholars recognized the potential downside of a judicial decision that
59. Id.
60. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
61. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
62. See supra nn.57-59 and accompanying text.
63. Id.
64. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
65. id. at571.
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seemingly relieved the Indian peoples of the very costly, and arguably nor-
matively intrusive, necessity of according equal protection or procedural
due process rights to all defendants who were potentially subject to tribal
governmental jurisdiction. Even fewer Indian law scholars intuited the
Schecter type confrontation that would arise if Congress sought to authorize
the Indian peoples to exercise criminal or civil jurisdiction over non-tribal
members in an instance wherein the Supreme Court, via its application of
its modem judicial divestment doctrine, had held the Indian peoples had
"lost" that particular sovereign prerogative of jurisdictional authority.66
H. Can The Indian Peoples Realize Meaningful Self Determination Via The
Judicial And Legislative Fulfillment Of Their Original Compact?
The Indian peoples have taken important, but limited, strides towards
self-determination within the confines of their original compact with Amer-
ica. Given that Congress has endorsed, beginning in 1975, the concept of
Indian self-determination as the guiding principle of its contemporary In-
dian law and policy, there has been some progress made toward the social
and economic development of Indian Country. 67 The Indian Self Determi-
nation Act of 197568 authorizes qualified Indian tribes to contractually "take
over" Indian benefit programs presently administered by the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs or the Indian Health Service. Under the contractual authority
granted by this act, many Indian tribes have assumed administrative control
of many BIA and IHS programs within their respective reservations.69
Other congressional efforts to promote Indian self-determination have
generated significant conflict with non-Indians' ostensible equal protection
and due process rights. This nation's first "reverse discrimination" law suit
arose from a non-Indian's equal protection challenge to an Indian employ-
ment provision of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).7 ° The BIA in
the early 1970s acted to enforce that hitherto dormant provision that called
for the preferential employment of qualified Indians within the BIA. The
BIA interpreted the purpose of this Indian employment preference statute to
be the eventual "Indianization" of that agency, where practicable.
The Supreme Court in 1974 heard a non-Indian employee's equal protec-
tion challenge to this Indian preference statute in Morton v. Mancari.7' The
Court agreed with the non-Indian plaintiffs characterization of the statute's
effect as imposing a significant "employment disadvantage" on non-Indian
employees of the BIA. The Court also agreed that if this Indian employ-
66. U.S. v. Lara, 2004 U.S. Lexis 2738 (April 10, 2004).
67. See generally Tadd M. Johnson and James Hamilton, Self-Governance For the Indian Tribes:
From Paternalism To Empowerment, 27 Conn. L. Rev. 1251 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson].
68. 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)-(n) (2000).
69. Johnson, supra n.67, at 1267-68.
70. Pub. L. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
71. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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ment preference was fulsomely implemented, then existing non-Indians
employees would be "gradual[ly] replace[d] by Indians within the BIA.
72
But the Court nonetheless held that the non-Indian plaintiff could not be
heard to complain because this Indian preference statute did not constitute
"racial discrimination" at all, it was, instead, a permissible means by which
Congress sought to fulfill a trust duty it owed to members of quasi-
sovereign Indian nations.73
I. Summary: Indian Self-Determination and the Deepened Exclusion of the
Indian Peoples from Participation in American Civic Life
By seeming consensus, almost everyone agrees that the Indian peoples
have made remarkable progress toward self-determination over the past
thirty years since Congress' adoption of the Indian Self-Determination
Act.74 But the Supreme Court's recent Indian law decisions-perhaps be-
cause of the Indian peoples' acknowledged economic and social develop-
ment-nonetheless confirm that the Indian peoples remains excluded, as
qua Indians, from any future role in American civic life. The Indian peo-
ples' entry into American civic life, therefore, has to be premised on a fun-
damentally different legal and political approach. In the next section of my
essay, I sketch the legal and political rationale for Indian civic participation
based on what I call the "second American founding" based on principles of
deep diversity.
III. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL PRESUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE SECOND
AMERICAN FOUNDING BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF DEEP DIVERSITY
A. Why the First American Founding Failed the Indian Peoples and Other
Ethnic Minorities of America
Many constitutional scholars have criticized the "first American found-
ing" as based on principles of political and legal exclusion, rather than on a
broad-gauged, inclusive vision of a liberal polity that welcomed future citi-
zens of all races, gender and religious or cultural affiliations.75  The Indian
72. Id. at 544.
73. Id. at 553.
74. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (a)-(n) (2000).
75. Professor Nathan Glazer, for example, argues that the Winning of the West, written on the epic
scale by Teddy Roosevelt, created the national text of "unabashed nationalism" for the displacement and
dispossession of the Indian peoples. The Indians in Roosevelt's text are unredeemably cruel and treach-
erous. He characterizes the Indians thus" Not only were they terrible in battle, but they were cruel be-
yond all belief in victory.. The hideous, unnamable, unthinkable tortures [practiced] by the red men on
their captured [foes'] tender women and helpless children were such as read of in no other struggle,
hardly even the revolting pages that tell the deeds of the Holy Inquisition." Nathan Glazer, American
Epic: Then and Now, Pub. Int. 12 (Winter 1998). Given the unredeemable Indian character, Roosevelt
feels no need for a retrospective national apology for the Indians' destruction by federal military forces:
"Looking back, it is easy to say that much of the wrong-doing could have been prevented; but if we
examine the facts to find out the truth, not to establish a theory, we are bound to admit that the struggle
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peoples were, of course, explicitly excluded by constitutional language
from any future civic participation in the American republic, while other
groups-particularly African-Americans and women-were implicitly ex-
cluded from any meaningful civic participation in the republic's future civic
life.76
The overtly compromised character of the "first American founding" is
best evidenced by the Fourteenth Amendment's continued exclusion of the
Indian peoples. That amendment's explicit purpose-as the proudest consti-
tutional product of the vaunted American Reconstruction Era-was to ex-
tend the right of civic participation to America's hitherto excluded "invol-
untary minorities" in a politically and morally "re-founded" American Re-
public.77 The lower federal courts interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's
blanket grant of citizenship to "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof' as intentionally ex-
cluding the Indian peoples.78
The Supreme Court later adopted that reasoning, in its 1884 decision in
Elk v. Wilkins,7 9 holding that an individual Indian could not free himself
from his Indian status by self-help through his voluntary adoption of non-
Indian ways of living which included paying taxes, sending his children to
public school and regularly attending Christian church services.8° Indeed,
some quasi-conservative constitutional legal scholars-such as Professor
Kenneth Karst-have criticized Congress's later enactment of the American
Indian Naturalization Act of 1924,8 1 as both potentially illegal, given the
exclusionary language of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Elk decision,
and wrong-headed because Indians should remain excluded from the na-
tional civic culture.
82
could not possibly have been avoided.....Unless we were willing that the whole continent west of the
Alleghenies should remain an unpeopled waste, the hunting ground of savages, war was inevitable." Id.
at 12-13.
76. David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians As Peoples, 38
UCLA L. Rev. 759 (1991).
77. McKay v. Campbell, 16 Fed. Cases 161, 165 (D. Or. 1871) (No. 8840).
78. Id.
79. 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (holding that Indians are "not subject to the jurisdiction" of the United
States, or citizens of the United States, or of the states within which they reside).
80. Id.
81. 8 U.S. C. § 1401(a)(2) (2000).
82. Indians should remain excluded from American civil society because their political participa-
tion, qua Indians, therein would fundamentally skew the ruling American concepts of equal protection
and due process. Karst makes this clear in his following statement: "[T]he separation of the Indian
nations from the rest of American society now rests on more than white domination and is actively
cultivated by a number of Indian leaders who see separation as the markedly from those faced by only
way to preserve their cultures. Among Indians, cultural politics has always faced issues that differ
among immigrant groups. None of our immigrants, from the Irish to the Vietnamese, have faced any-
thing closely nations, or the pan-Indian comparable to the questions raised by the role of the reservation,
the reach of sovereignty of Indian movement. Those issues confront Indians, as individuals and nations,
with some hard choices as they seek to preserve their separate cultures and still participate in the Ameri-
can economy and society. Whatever political forms may emerge from the current ferment, the larger
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My sketch of the political and legal rationale underlying a real, not
merely rhetorical, second American founding presumes the founding of a
"new Indian citizenship." This new citizenship, deriving from principles of
deep diversity, will become the primary means by which Indians, qua Indi-
ans, can achieve full participation in the civic life of the re-founded Ameri-
can Republic. It further presumes that if the Indian peoples succeed in their
endeavor of establishing a new Indian citizenship, then its underlying civic
principles can be extended to other existing and emerging ethnic and cul-
tural minorities within America.83
Hopefully, the non-Indians' residual "fear and prudence," that caused
them to originally exclude the Indian peoples from American social and
political life, will have to be allayed via thorough educational and dialogic
means of encounter between these two peoples. Fortunately, there are po-
litical and legal means at hand to develop this new dialogic relationship. I
first sketch this process of legal and political dialogue that will lay the
ground work for this second American founding. I then sketch, in bare out-
line, what this new civic relationship, founded on principles of deep diver-
sity, may look like.
B. Constructing an Appropriate Mythology for the Second American
Founding
The chronicle of the first American founding was written in the shed
blood of patriots and the cant of American Manifest Destiny. The chronicle
of the second American founding will be written in the more modest, but
equally hard muscled, grammar of human generosity, tolerance and diver-
sity.84 The principles of the first American founding were constitutionally
broadcast in universal terms that ostensibly commanded justice and equality
for all, but, in practice, were available only to the select few deemed fit to
govern in the first American republic. The principles of the second Ameri-
can founding will, in theory and practice, welcome and respect the differing
ethnic, cultural and religious minorities who choose to enrich and build this
new American society. The accompanying mythology of this new Ameri-
can republic appropriately begins by welcoming the Indian peoples into the
civic life of the old American Republic.
The transition to this new America is made legally and politically possi-
ble by incorporating the political theory of economist and social theorist, A.
society has an obligation--the obligations of citizens to each other-to see that Indian peoples have the
resources they need if these choices are to be real." See David Williams, supra n. 76, at 772.
83. Professor Adeno Addis has coined the phrase "pluralistic solidarity" that will facilitate the
development of "institutional structures and processes that would simultaneously allow us to affirm and
respect plurality while also cultivation some notion of [national] solidarity." Adeno Addis, On Human
Diversity and the Limits of Toleration, in Ethnicity And Group Rights 112 (Ian Shapiro and Will Kym-
licka eds., N.Y. U. Press 1997).
84. Id.
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K. Sen.85 Sen argues for affirmative governmental action that builds the
agential capacities of hitherto politically and socially excluded groups-
women, as well as unwelcome ethnic and cultural minorities-as the means
for creating greater social wealth and the promoting of shared democratic
values and interests.86 Sen would likely agree that the Indian peoples, as
well as other American ethnic and cultural minorities, would embrace this
new American citizenship because it does not demand, as did the old ver-
sion of American citizenship, that they sacrifice their Indian identities and
cultural values as the price for their admission into American civic life. 87
In the next two sections of my essay I contrast the "wrong" way and the
"right" way of achieving this transition to a new citizenship status for
America's hitherto excluded ethnic and cultural minorities-particularly the
American Indian peoples. The wrong transitional strategy derives from non-
Indians' historic "fear and prudence" that lead them to regard the Indian
peoples, as well as other contemporary American ethnic and cultural mi-
norities, as the potentially dangerous, "excluded other." This wrong strategy
presumes that their inclusion will threaten the delicately woven political
and social fabric of the American civic order. I examine the failure of this
first strategy that sought to "shoehorn" the Indian peoples as a newly racial-
ized minority group, into a new American citizenship status. By this think-
ing, Indians would benefit legally and politically because as a racial, rather
than a political, minority they would be entitled to the affirmative protec-
tions afforded by the equal protection and due process clauses of the Con-
stitution.
88
C. Why the Attempted "Shoehorning" of the Indian Peoples, as a Newly
Racialized Minority, into Contemporary American Civic Life, Failed
1. Why Indian Peoples Were Re-Classified as a Racial Minority During the
American Civil Rights and Great Society Eras of the 1960s and 1970s
Re-classifying the Indian peoples as a racial minority during the Ameri-
can civil rights era of the mid to late 1960s seemed to afford a quick and
economical means to end the Indian peoples' longstanding exclusion from
American civic life.89 Indeed, this re-conception of Indians as a racial mi-
nority made practical and legal sense. The red-hot rhetoric of the civil rights
85. Amartya Komar Sen, Development as Freedom 145-59 (1st ed., Oxford U. Press 1999).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Professor Mark Tushnet, while not explicitly mentioning American Indians, obviously speaks
to their politically and economically excluded status as ethnic minorities when he speaks of the "consti-
tutional vision of the New Deal-Great Society regime" in these terms: "Racial segregation had to be
overcome by aggressive policies of national support for the aspirations of African-Americans; economic
inequality had to be addressed through a War on Poverty; the travails of old age had to be reduced by
providing health care to the elderly through the Medicare program." Mark Tushnet, The New Constitu-
tional Order 30 (Princeton U. Press 2003).
89. Id.
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activists, during the 1960s and 1970s, exposed the Indian peoples to the
reality of their exclusion from the economic and political realms of Ameri-
can power and success. Many Indian peoples participated in the famed 1968
"Poor People's March on Washington," thus demonstrating their solidarity
with other destitute and politically powerless American ethnic and cultural
minorities. Many Indian young peoples, myself included, benefited persQn-
ally from those government initiatives directed at overcoming economic
and social disadvantages imposed on the Indian peoples by entrenched,
ostensibly race-based state and private discrimination, coupled with institu-
tional barriers that had historically hindered their entry into the professional
and political life of America. 90
Indians were perceived by civil rights activists as having been originally
imprisoned on their respective Indian reservations by wrong headed, if not
discriminatory, federal action in the late nineteenth century. Given their
heightened poverty rate and their lack of educational achievement, the In-
dian peoples were viewed as especially worthy recipients of federal civil
rights and social welfare attention.
Because I grew up on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, North Da-
kota, during the "hay day" of President Kennedy's civil rights revolution
and President Johnson's Great Society programs, I witnessed the federal
expenditure of millions of dollars, on my home reservation alone, to fund
new Indian housing developments, create new reservation-based jobs and
fund new Indian education initiatives. Some Indian leaders, such as my
father, a tribal council member at that time, deemed these federal anti-
poverty expenditures as the long delayed fulfillment of the government's
Indian treaty and trust duty obligations. Meanwhile, leaders of other ethnic
minority groups, particularly those African-Americans residing in Amer-
ica's economically by-passed inner cities, viewed these new civil rights
initiatives and social welfare reforms, as the long delayed federal action
necessary to redeem America from its ignoble history of slavery.91
2. Why This Wrong Strategy Failed to Achieve its Legal and Political Goals
There are many competing theories as to why the American civil rights
revolution and the Great Society programs of the 1960s and 1970s failed to
realize their legal and political goal of integrating America's hitherto ex-
cluded ethnic and racial minorities into the professional and economic life
of America. 92 Somewhat reluctantly, I add my own assessment to the al-
ready lengthy list of commentators on this issue. In my opinion, these initia-
tives failed because they sought to integrate the Indian peoples, as well as
90. David Getches, et. al., Federal Indian Law 226 (4th ed.).
91. Tauyna Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance To Racial Reconciliation in the United
States, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 903 (Summer, 2003).
92. Richard J. Herrnstein & Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure In
American Life (Free Press 1994).
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other ethnic and cultural minorities, as "honorary whites" into American
economic and social life. As Professor Williams demonstrated early, these
contemporary civil rights and social welfare programs were built on the
deeply flawed "ethnic succession" model which required the targeted ethnic
minorities to shed their deeply held, perhaps seemingly idiosyncratic, be-
liefs and values as the price of their admission into American citizenship. 93
Understandably, many, if not most, of the Indian peoples rejected civil and
political "integration" into American civic life as unduly destructive of their
unique life-ways.
94
It's not surprising, therefore, that by the early 1980s, the grand era of
civil rights and Great Society reforms came to a screeching halt. While
some political pundits attribute this outcome to a sea change in the Ameri-
can peoples' attitude towards "big government" and "big social welfare
programs," I believe these initiatives failed primarily because the Indian
peoples, and other ethnic and cultural minorities, did not want to be "inte-
grated" into American civic life in the manner demanded by these initia-
tives. It's true that many critics focused on the alleged failure of these fed-
eral initiatives to quickly produce the economic and social assimilation of
America's ethnic minority groups into mainstream American life. Other
critics branded the Civil Rights and Great Society initiatives of the 1960s as
overly grandiose and practicably unrealizable "social engineering" prescrip-
tions. Some of those same critics claimed that their failure proved the bogus
character of the theory and practice of racial integration as the route to a
morally refounded American republic.95 Predictably perhaps, the competing
Presidential hopefuls during the 1980 election-both Democratic and Re-
publican-competed to "re-invent" a leaner and meaner federal government
that would "get off the peoples' backs" by radically shrinking the federal
government's social welfare and regulatory roles in Americans' lives.96
3. How the Failure of the Integrationist Ideal Introduced Agential Theory
into American Life
I have chosen two climactic federal actions to symbolize the closing of
the "integrationist" era of American civil rights law, and the arrival of the
"agential" era of federal Indian law. The first climactic action is represented
by President William Jefferson Clinton's political "change of heart" that led
him to champion the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. 97 Some of his staunchest political
93. See B. Williams, supra n. 39, at 401-44.
94. Id.
95. See Herrnstein, supra n. 93.
96. William R. O'Neill, Commonweal of Woe? The Ethics of Welfare Reform, II Notre Dame J.L,
Ethics & Pub. Policy 487 (1997).
97. This act imposes work requirements and lifetime caps, limits aid to young mothers, limits aid.
to immigrants, and provides for child support enforcement. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
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allies opposed this act as a breach of a long standing federal promise to
protect the America's dependent and vulnerable children. 98 But Clinton
argued that in order to save the federal welfare program at all, it had to be
fundamentally recast in, what I call, agentialist terms. America's welfare
"moms and dads" are effectively appointed by this act as their dependent
children's agents. They are given a stringently limited period of welfare
eligibility in which to become dependable economic providers for their
dependent children.99
The second climactic action is symbolized by Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
berg's recent opinion in United States v. Navajo Nation. 1oo Her Navajo
Nation opinion requires Indian peoples to become independent and active
agents in their assertion and protection of their distinctive legal rights. In
Navajo Nation, the United States challenged the lower federal court's deci-
sion that declared it in breach of its Indian trust duties, thereby rendering it
potentially liable for over $600 million in damages to the. Navajo Nation. 10'
The facts of this case focused on the Interior Secretary's admittedly unsa-
vory conduct in connection with his execution of a Navajo coal lease with
Peabody Coal Company in the early 1980s. °2 The Court had to decide
whether his shabby treatment of his Navajo wards' legal and economic in-
terests breached the trust duties that he owed to those Indian peoples. Un-
disputed facts showed that Interior Secretary Donald P. Hodel secretly set
aside, at Peabody Coal's behest, a BIA recommended 20% lease royalty
rate based on the prevailing fair market value of the affected Navajo coal
resource.
0 3
Instead of exercising his secretarial power to include that recommended
rate as part of the proposed lease agreement, Secretary Hodel told the Nava-
jos to go back to the bargaining table and make the best deal they could
with Peabody CoalY°4 Chastened by Hodel's advice, the Navajos returned
to the bargaining table and eventually negotiated a 12.5% per ton royalty
rate with Peabody Coal. 0 5 The Navajos' complaint claimed they thereby
lost over $600 million in foregone royalty payments over the life of the coal
lease.
But the Supreme Court, per Justice Ginsberg's opinion, reversed the
lower court's breach of trust holding. It did so because the Navajo Indians,
and presumably the other Indian peoples, as well, must now act, given her
reading of the IMLA's self-determination language and intent, as legally
98. See Larry Cata Baca, Poor Relief Welfare Paralysis and Assimilation, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 1, 2-
3 (1996).
99. Id.
100. 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
101. Id. at 495-96.
102. Id. at 498.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 497.
105. Id.
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and economically capable agents who bear the primary responsibility for
negotiating beneficial mineral lease agreements with outside third party
interests. 1°6 Justice Ginsberg quoted the IMLA's statutory preamble de-
scribing its overriding purpose as the "enhancement of tribal self-
determination.' ' 7 Given this plain statutory intent, she concluded that it
was the Navajo tribe's responsibility, not Secretary Hodel's responsibility,
to negotiate a fair deal with Peabody Coal Company. She concludes:
"In sum neither the IMLA, nor any of its regulations, estab-
lished anything more than a bare minimum royalty. Hence,
there is no textual basis for concluding that the Secretary's
approval function includes a duty, enforceable in an action
for money damages, to ensure a higher rate of return for the
tribe concerned. Similarly, no pertinent statutory or regula-
tory provision requires the Secretary, on the pain of dam-
ages, to conduct an independent "economic analysis" of the
reasonableness of the royalty to which a tribe and a third
party have agreed.',
10 8
4. Why Justice Ginsberg's Theory of Indian Agentialism Will Fail
These two federal actions seek to establish a new legal and political rela-
tionship between America's ethnic minorities, including the Indian peoples,
and mainstream American society. The Indian peoples and other ethnic
minorities are given notice that they can no longer function as passive rights
holders. They must now become active agents, acting on their own behalf,
to promote and protect their rights, abilities, talents and resources. But Jus-
tice Ginsberg's "Indian agentialism" rationale suffers from the vice of pre-
suming its result. She failed to take into account the widely varying educa-
tional, economic and social circumstances of America's many Indian peo-
ples. Put simply, the agential capacity of any given Indian peoples is di-
rectly correlated to, and to a large degree determined by, that particular
Indian people's knowledge base and experiential record as it relates to a
particular self-determination endeavor.10 9
Perhaps the Indian peoples should, as Justice Ginsberg's opinion encour-
ages them to do, scrutinize their past dependence on their legal trustee, the
federal government, to act on their behalf in the assertion and protection of
their unique rights and entitlements. But Ginsberg does not explain how
such self-scrutiny will aid the Indian peoples in becoming more effective
106. Id. at 513.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Robert Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism
Succeed? 80 Or. L. Rev. I (Fall 2001).
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agents on their own behalf. Her only oblique suggestion, in this regard, is
her bare citation to the self-determination language of the IMLA." 0
Justice Ginsberg's Navajo Nation opinion imports, into the legally and
politically incommensurate Indian self-determination context, the well-
worn neoliberal claim that today's ethnic minority groups have become
overly dependent on federal and state help for their economic subsistence.
An early academic critic of President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society ini-
tiatives, Professor Daniel Patrick Moynihan, worried that easy federal or
state welfare eligibility may condemn America's ethnic minorities to a
multi-generational cycle of joblessness and single-parent families, eventu-
ally sapping their individual and collective initiative to do the hard work
necessary to climb out of poverty. But Moynihan failed, as does Ginsberg,
to set forth any affirmative program of agential development that would
restore these damaged groups to a contemporary ethic of individual and
collective self-regard.'
1
'
Absent a realistic, governmentally supported, program for agential de-
velopment, these two federal actions-Justice Ginsberg's Navajo Nation
opinion and Bill Clinton's welfare act-seem merely petty and punitive in
nature. No respected authority on development theory has claimed that the
Indian peoples-absent substantial financial and technical assistance from
their trustee-the federal government---can become effective agents of self-
determination who are capable of negotiating fair mineral development
agreements with powerful and influential non-Indian economic interests.
1 2
Likewise, no respected social welfare thinker has argued that today's wel-
fare "moms and dads," can effectively transition, without substantial fed-
eral financial and technical assistance, into effective wage earners, capable
of supporting their dependent children."l
3
The dictionary definition of agential success is the personal or collective
ability to make and carry out informed decision for a particular person's
own, as well as for his particular group's, benefit. By all reasonable expert
accounts on the subject, the putative agent must undergo an extensive pro-
gram of appropriately tailored training and professional mentorship. Given
that reality, any long term program for agential development must be de-
signed around the circumstances and aspirations of particular Indian peo-
ples or other targeted ethnic minority groups.
110. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 488.
111. See Baca, supra n. 99.
112. Miller, supra n. 109, at 837.
113. Baca, supra n. 99.
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IV. THE SECOND AMERICAN FOUNDING WILL BEGIN WITH "SPECIFIC AND
LOCALIZED" DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE INDIAN AND NON- INDIAN PEOPLES
IN FAR-FLUNG PLACES SUCH AS MONTANA
A. Re-Defining Agential Development as a Shared Responsibility of Both
Indian and Non-Indian Peoples
Justice Ginsberg and President Clinton seem to assume that agential de-
velopment is a task borne solely by America's Indian peoples and other
ethnic minority groups, and that such an endeavor is not a shared responsi-
bility of the American peoples generally. Such a mistaken view of agential
development will only perpetuate the de facto, if not de jure, exclusion of
the Indian peoples and other ethnic minorities from American civic life. I
sketch an alternative vision of agential development that will hopefully,
over the long-term, lead to a "second founding" of the American republic.
My alternative vision is built around A. K. Sen's "freedom centered" pro-
gram of agential development. His theory of economic and social develop-
ment focuses on the individual's agential success as the primary instrumen-
tal means of ensuring a given society's maturation into a just and well-
ordered society.
14
Sen identifies three crucial "freedoms" that form the core of his program
of individual, as well as group, agential development. Sen focuses on a so-
ciety's educational system as the primary means for instilling the individual
understanding, and valuation, of these three freedoms as crucial for his or
her future individual development, as well as for their society's future de-
velopment. 15 Both Sen and minority educational advocates rightfully em-
phasize education as the sine qua non for the individual's meaningful exer-
cise of these three agential freedoms.
Sen's crucial individual freedoms are political freedom, economic free-
dom and social freedom.11 6 First, he contends that only the educated indi-
vidual possesses the capacity to exercise political freedom through the in-
formed scrutinizing and criticizing of official societal action. Only the edu-
cated individual possesses the capacity to effectively express his political
opinions and beliefs through his exercise of the democratic franchise of
dialogue, dissent and criticism. Second, he maintains that only the educated
individual possesses the capability to exercise economic freedom wisely
and responsibly so as to use his personal talents, in combination with soci-
ety's economic resources, in making his consumption, production and ex-
change decisions. Third, he argues that only the educated individual pos-
sesses the capacity to interact with the larger social community on the basis
of mutual respect, equality and trust. Only the educated individual pos-
114. Sen, supra n. 85 at 145-59.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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sesses the capability to make wise use of available social information so as
to make informed inter-personal judgments and establish meaningful life
relationships."
7
Undoubtedly, many of us-as parents, as educators, or just good citi-
zens-already intuitively and instinctively subscribe to Sen's "freedom
centered" view of agential development. We may further intuitively and
instinctively subscribe to Sen's view that the lack of an education may well
diminish a given individual's appreciation and enjoyment of his or her so-
cial freedoms. In the extreme case, we may also grasp that a given individ-
ual's lack of a basic education may amount to the denial of his or her civil
or human right to become a functioning member of our society. Fortu-
nately, Montana has likewise grasped Sen's pragmatic points and it has
sought to constitutionally link his "freedom centered" view of education to
the agential and self-determination rights of each individual school child in
Montana's K- 12 educational system. 18
B. Beginning the Second American Founding In Montana: Three Case
Studies in Localized and Specialized Agential Development
Clifford Geertz urges us to re-discover "a plurality of ways of [societal]
belonging and being" that re-establishes a new "sense of connectedness that
is neither uniform nor comprehensive" so as to recognize the multi-ethnic
heritage and integrity of contemporary America.1 9 1 present three local and
specialized case studies in agential development that I believe exhibit
Geertz's call for new political and legal means for founding a new Ameri-
can society.
My first case study focuses on Montana's extraordinary constitutional
commitment to deliver an "Indian centered" education so as to build the
agential capabilities of both non-Indian and Indian school children within
its K-12 educational system. My second case study focuses on the newly
activist role played by Indian political representatives, within Montana's
political system, as the agents for building a more open and inclusive de-
mocratic process within this state. My third case study focuses on the agen-
tial role played by the Indian lawyers and other professionals in building A.
K. Sen's vision of the just and well-ordered society in Montana and else-
where. 20
117. Id.
118. Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of History and the Nation's Debt to
the Indian Peoples, 21 UALR L. Rev. 941, 965-69 (Summer 1999).
119. Geertz, supra n. 21, at 224.
120. Sen, supra n. 85, at 145-59.
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1. Case Study One: Montana's Constitutional Obligation To Provide
"Indian Education For All"
My first case study focuses on Montana's constitutional commitment to
link Sen's agential development principles to the "on the ground" educa-
tional processes and practices within its K-12 educational system. By
adopting Article X, section 1, clause 2, of the Montana Constitution of
1972, the peoples of Montana declared: "The state recognizes the distinct
and unique cultural heritage of the American Indians, and it is committed in
its educational goals to the preservation of their cultural integrity."' 121
This constitutional recognition of the American Indians' cultural heritage
as an integral part of Montana's educational mission has profound agential
development implications for the reconstruction of elementary and secon-
dary education in Montana. This provision, on the one hand, repudiates past
state and federal Indian educational initiatives that sought to coercively
assimilate Indian school children into the values and practices of the sur-
rounding non-Indian communities. This provision, on the other hand,
positively values the Indian peoples' cultural and social contributions by
requiring them to become an integral part of its K- 12 educational system for
all Montana's school children, Indian and non-Indian. 123
But, as is the case with all pragmatic endeavors, the "proof of the pud-
ding is in the eating." Montana faces a daunting financial and social chal-
lenge in implementing its constitutionally promised "Indian education for
all." It has taken some crucial, but tentative, first steps towards implement-
ing that provision. The state legislature has recently enacted House Bill 528
which encourages public school districts, especially those on or near Indian
reservations and those with large Indian student enrollment, to ensure that
their certified teaching personnel have an adequate grounding in historic
and contemporary Indian history and culture.
121
This past legislative session, the state legislature considered, but rejected,
proposed Indian education legislation that would have authorized local
school districts to hire Indian teachers preferentially under the appropriate
circumstances. Other states with large Indian populations, such as Minne-
sota, have all ready adopted such statutes. The Minnesota Indian teacher
preference statute is part of its larger American Indian Education Act of
1988.125
That act's preamble cited to current learning theory and concluded that
Indian school children may benefit from being taught by Indian teachers
who both grasp and understand their distinctive cultural and social learning
121. Cross, supra n. 119, at 965-69.
122. Id.
123. id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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styles and needs. For these practical reasons, the Minnesota Appeals Court
upheld the statute against an equal protection challenge. The court held
Minnesota's Indian teacher preference statute was a rational and logical
response to the daunting challenge of improving Indian educational
achievement within that state's public schools.1
26
Montana has recognized that education will play an important role in en-
suring the future agential success of both its non-Indian and Indian school
children. However, the state legislature and the state courts have taken only
the first steps towards realizing its educational mission on behalf of Indian
and non-Indian school children in Montana. 1
27
2. Case Study Two: Building Indian Political Agency in Montana
Sen's credo of agential development as the enhancement of human free-
dom requires a given civil society to assist its ethnic or cultural minority
groups in their explicit recognition and assertion of their political interests
in both conceptual and practical terms. 28 Only recently have Montana's
Indian peoples sought greater political representation in state and local gov-
ernmental affairs. Their new political engagement has required them to
learn the intricacies and complexities of "hard ball" local and state politics.
Originally, they sought to achieve greater political representation in state
and local governmental affairs without the active support or help of the
state of Montana or the federal courts. But bitter experience confirmed that
entrenched, non-Indian political interests preferred the Indian peoples re-
main on the political sidelines, excluded from any effective political voice
in the state affairs.
2 9
The relatively few Indian representatives in Montana's legislature have
understandably sought to leverage their limited political influence by estab-
lishing common cause and alliances with non-Indian legislators who share
their values and goals. For example, Indian representative Carol Juneau,
from the Blackfeet Reservation, works with fellow non-Indian legislators to
implicitly address Indian peoples' issues under the broader banner of
"women's social agency" issues. She recognized that both Indian and non-
Indian women in Montana seek an improved health care and welfare status
for themselves and their children. 30
But achieving a meaningful measure of Indian political agency in Mon-
tana, as elsewhere, has proven a never ending and uphill battle. A brief
126. Id.
127. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's finding of fact "that Blaine
County's white residents voted as a bloc to prevent American Indians from electing their preferred
candidates." See United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2004).
128. Sen, supra n. 85, at 145-59.
129. Id.
130. My personal conversations with state representative Carol Juneau, who also happens to be my
sister, over the course of her tenure in office, is the source of these remarks.
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case study may illustrate this reality. Disenfranchised Indian voters chal-
lenged Montana's 1992 state redistricting plan in federal court as violating
their electoral rights under the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 131 Because Mon-
tana's 1972 Constitution had created a new bipartisan redistricting commis-
sion and had empowered it to periodically reapportion the state legislature,
the protection of minority voting rights became the constitutional responsi-
bility of that commission. 
32
Given the Indian voters' pending federal lawsuits, Montana's 1999 legis-
lative redistricting commission began its work under the watchful eye of
federal judge Pro. He expressed his fulsome confidence that the state com-
mission would "preserve the orderly administration of elections and en-
courage the highest possible participation by the [Indian] electorate and
potential [Indian] candidates."'' 33 Astute political insiders, such as Assistant
Attorney General Sarah Bond, interpreted the judge's remark as encourag-
ing the commission to be highly attuned to the political aspirations of the
state's Indian electorate.
34
The state commission's proposed plan, known as Plan 300, sought to ad-
dress the Indian voters' representational concerns by increasing the number
of "Indian majority" voting districts from six to nine. But not every one was
thrilled with "Plan 300." Montana's Republicans, who controlled both
houses of the state legislature, complained the plan was both mathemati-
cally and democratically flawed, as seeming to favor potential Democratic
political candidates. Indian leaders, such as Mr. Bruce Sun Child, Vice-
Chair of the Chippewa-Cree Tribal Council, applauded the proposed redis-
tricting plan, saying: "It won't cause injustice, it will restore justice."'
135
131. The named Indian plaintiffs contended that Montana's 1992 legislative redistricting plan for the
House of Representatives and Senate unfairly diluted the voting strength of American Indian voters and
was adopted with a discriminatory purpose, thereby violating the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, in significant part, the lower court's judgment in favor of Montana's
Governor and Secretary of State. See Old Person v. Cooney, 230 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). Although
the appeals court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the Indian plaintiffs had not demonstrated that
Montana's 1992 legislative redistricting plan was adopted with a discriminatory purpose, it also held the
lower court had erred in its application of the relevant law to other aspects of the plaintiffs' legal claims.
Id. at 1131. That court also concluded that the lower court erred in finding proportionality between the
number of state legislative districts in which Indian voters constituted an effective majority and the
American Indian share of the voting age population of Montana. Id.
132. Indeed, federal district judge, Philip M. Pro, upon remand of the Old Person proceedings to the
lower court for further action, judicially acknowledged the vital "role of the 2000 Montana [legislative
redistricting] Commission in fashioning a viable remedy" to address the Indian plaintiffs' complaints in
the Old Person case. See Old Person v. Brown, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1015 (D.Mont. 2002). The Indian
plaintiffs offered statements by Montana's Attorney General and the 2000 Montana Commission as
"admission[s] of a Voting Rights Act violation with regards to the particular House and Senate Districts
at issue in the case." Id. at 1015. While Judge Pro found these proffered hearsay statements to be "unde-
niably trustworthy and relevant to the proceedings," he did not deem them tantamount to the state's
admission that it had violated the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Id.
133. Judge Pro declined to judicially compel partial legislative redistricting because such action may
impair the on-going deliberations and functions of that commission. Id. at 1019.
134. Id.
135. See Summary Minutes of Hearing on HB 309 3 (Jan. 17, 2003).
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State Republican leaders disagreed, and hastily enacted a new state law
prohibiting the Secretary of State from accepting any legislative redistrict-
ing plan that deviated by more than 1% from the mathematically equal leg-
islative district of 9.022 residents. Because the commission's plan allowed
up to a 5% deviation from such equally sized districts, it facially violated
the new enacted state law on the matter. Achieving greater Indian political
agency in Montana fell into hands of a state district judge, the Honorable
Dorothy McCarter. She struck down the new state law as an unconstitu-
tional interference with the commission's express constitutional authority
and duties. 1
36
3. Case Study Three: Building Indian Legal Agency in Montana and
Elsewhere
Legal agency-the independent capacity and power of the Indian peoples
to assert and protect their legal rights-is a recent phenomenon. 137 Indeed,
much of modem Indian case and statutory law has been created by the In-
dian peoples' increasingly effective exercise of their newly confirmed legal
agential powers. The recent spate of breach of trust lawsuits brought by the
Indian peoples against their putative trustee, the federal government, for the
mal-administration of their trust resources exhibits the reality of their new
agential status. 138 Furthermore, modem American civil rights law was liter-
ally created by hitherto excluded ethnic minorities who asserted their new
agential status through lawsuits against those federal and state officials who
had long denied them the exercise of their fundamental personal civil rights
and liberties.
139
But making legal agency a working reality for the Indian peoples and the
other American ethnic minority groups requires the resolution of that
threshold question initially recognized during the late 1960s and early
1970s. To paraphrase, where are those Indian and other ethnic minority
lawyers who intrinsically grasp their communities' underlying legal and
social needs so as to competently represent their interests before the courts,
administrative agencies and legislatures? The resounding practical retort
given to this question was: "There are none !"140
The same negative response was given when that question was asked in
other important Indian or minority agential contexts. There, the response
was: there are too few Indian or ethnic minority medical doctors, elemen-
136. See Let New Legislative Redistricting Plan Stand, Great Falls Tribune (July 14, 2003).
137. Profess David Getches attributes this, in part, to the success of the Pre-Law Summer Institute,
at the University of New Mexico. Getches, supra n.90 at 19. Beginning in 1967, this BIA and congres-
sionally supported programs has, as of 1993, provided financial and other assistance "to over one-half of
the 1500 Native American attorneys nationwide..."d. at 19-20.
138. Cobell v. Babbit, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999).
139. Getches, supra n. 90, at 19.
140. Philip S. Deloria, The American Indian Law Center: An Informal History, 24 N.M. L. Rev. 285
(Spring 1994).
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tary teachers, academics, engineers, scientists, or social workers to create
the critical mass of agents needed to rebuild those shattered communities.
How do we quickly create those Indian and ethic minority professionals
who will give flesh and blood content to the rhetorical idea of agential
competence within their respective communities?'
4
'
In the late 1960s, this reality spurred the BIA, and other federal Indian
action agencies, to institute several important Indian affirmative action pro-
grams.142 These programs' avowed purpose was to quickly produce a criti-
cal mass of Indian lawyers, as well other important Indian professionals, so
as to give reality to the concept of Indian agential power. A similar empiri-
cal reality spurred President Lyndon Johnson to sign an executive order in
1965 requiring federal agencies and their contractors to develop affirmative
action programs designed to create new agential opportunities for qualified
ethnic minority individuals, businesses and organizations. 143 President
Johnson's express goal in endorsing affirmative action as a federal goal was
to give representational reality to the historic American ideal of equal op-
portunity under the law. 144
But the intervening years have witnessed a significant rollback in both
federal Indian and ethnic minority affirmative action programs. Both the
judicial and executive branches of the federal government have questioned
the legality and social efficacy of racially targeted federal and state gov-
ernment's affirmative action programs. 45 Some newly minted ethnic mi-
nority academics have claimed that these programs unfairly stigmatize
those very minority individuals they were intended to benefit.
46
This rollback has substantially blunted, but has not completely derailed,
the significant agential contributions made by those newly minted Indian
and ethnic minority professionals in their respective communities in Amer-
ica. Without these new Indian lawyers, and other newly minted Indian pro-
fessionals, it is doubtful that Indian self-determination gains made in the
past three decades would have been possible in America's Indian reserva-
tions and in the many urban Indian communities. Nor has this rollback si-
lenced the on-going political and legal debate over these issues within an
increasingly multi-cultural and multi-racial America.
C. Summary: Placing These Three Case Studies in Context
These three case studies provide modest evidence that my hypothesized
agential revolution may already be underway in America. If so, its success
stems from, I believe, the average American's recognition that only by em-
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Getches, supra n. 90, at 19.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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bracing the principles of deep diversity will America successfully adapt to
the globalized economy and "world culture" of the future. By welcoming
the Indian peoples, as contemporary cultural and political forces to be reck-
oned with, Montana can provide practical and realistic approaches as to
how other American localities and regions may work with other ethnic and
cultural groups within their borders. Deep diversity, when viewed from this
pragmatic perspective, furthers the economic and political self-interest of
non-Indian America.
Meaningful cultural and social change grows from below and slowly in-
filtrates and alters the institutional features of a given society. Is there evi-
dence that principles of deep diversity have infiltrated our American institu-
tions so as to modify their basic processes and practices? In my conclusion
I briefly evaluate a recent Supreme Court decision suggesting that princi-
ples of deep diversity have infiltrated our most significant foundational
document-the United States Constitution.
V. THE USES AND MIS-USES OF DIVERSITY THEORY AND PRACTICE: WHY
THE SECOND AMERICAN FOUNDING REQUIRES A BOTTOM-UP RATHER
THAN TOP-DOWN STRATEGY
Ecological historian Tim Flannery argues it was the Indian peoples who
taught non-Indian settlers how to tame, and ultimately conquer, the Ameri-
can frontier.14 7 Conquering the next great American frontier-that of found-
ing a just and equitable society-will also require the Indian people's active
participation and assistance. Demographers maintain that by 2050 the
United States will become, as the states of California and New Mexico al-
ready have become, a minority-majority nation. Diversity, for better or
worse, has already created a poly-ethnic and poly-cultural America. Just as
the Indians taught the starving Pilgrim immigrants of Plymouth Colony
how to adapt to a harsh land, so too can today's America's ethnic and cul-
tural minorities help teach non-Indians how to adapt to their new political
and social roles in the America of 2050.
My conviction is that America's future adaptation to diversity will be
best realized through localized and graduated initiatives, similar to those
now on-going between the Indian and non-Indian peoples of Montana, that
compel political dialogue and mutual political accommodation so as to re-
solve local conflicts. Furthermore, I believe that a bottom-up approach to
resolving potential ethnic and cultural conflicts will likely produce more
realistic and sustainable outcomes than any other alternative. The past des-
ultory history of top-down approaches-whether legislative, judicial or
regulatory-to the resolution of diversity based concerns and conflicts
seems to justify this approach.
147. Tim Flannery, The Eternal Frontier: An Ecological History of North America And Its Peoples,
272-74 (A. Mthly. Press 2001).
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National level discussions tend to focus on the deep legal thinking re-
quired to make diversity compatible with the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Nowhere is this conceptual struggle more evident than in the
recent Supreme Court decision upholding diversity-based admissions pro-
grams in America's public colleges and universities.148 Some commentators
argue that the Court's slim majority was swayed by the "occupational need"
rationale for diversity, rather than by any deep re-theorizing of the equal
protection clause. By this view, Justice O'Connor and her colleagues took a
"common sense" approach to resolving the thorny constitutional issues in
this case. One commentator, Bryan W. Leach, emphasizes the functional
value of diversity as crucial factor in the majority's decision:
"After reviewing the pedagogical benefits of diversity, the
Grutter majority turned to another line of arguments that in
its view 'further bolstered' the law school's claim of a
compelling state interest. What these arguments shared in
common was their recognition of the important role that
universities play in preparing students to succeed in their
chosen professions. Specifically, the Court described the
pressing need for tomorrow's leaders to interact capably
with peoples from diverse cultural backgrounds. In order to
cultivate these skills, students should be 'expos[ed] to
widely diverse peoples, cultures, ideas and viewpoints.'
The Court did not dwell on the importance of racial sensi-
tivity as a virtue in its own right. Rather, the development
of greater cross-racial understanding was characterized as a
means of promoting the smooth functioning of 'today's in-
creasingly global marketplace,' preserving 'the military's
ability to fulfill it principle [sic] mission to provide national
security.' and cultivating a set of political and judicial lead-
ers 'with legitimacy in eyes of the citizenry.
' ' 149
Some other commentators have criticized the Court's proffered, func-
tionally based rationales for diversity as both cynical and banal. While I
share some of that sentiment, explaining diversity in terms of the economic
and security focused self-interest of today's non-Indian majority does make
practical sense. Down the road, once the non-Indians' "fear and prudence"
concerns about diversity are allayed; a deeper dialogue about the moral and
ethical significance of the "second American founding" can be broached.
As with so many things in societal life, patience may prove to be a virtue in
this endeavor.
148. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
149. Bryan W. Leach, Race as Mission Critical: The Occupational Need Rationale in Military
Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 Yale L. J. 1093, 1103 (2004).
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